the financial crisis in these states. However, public-sector unions' support of Democratic candidates, coupled with the increase in public-sector unionism, may explain the true motivations behind the recent attack on unionized public workers.
This note argues that public-sector labor reform laws-such as those passed in Wisconsin, Ohio, Michigan and Indiana-violate the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II of this note contextualizes the attack on public-sector workers, provides a snapshot of the contentious history of public-sector unions, and exposes the myth of the overcompensated public employee. Part III walks through a First Amendment analysis of these recent labor reform laws and distinguishes them from precedent in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association. 4 Part IV explores the possibility of challenging these laws under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part V examines the successes and shortcomings of recent case law that addresses the attack on public-sector workers.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Contextualizing the Attack on Public-Sector Unions
It is no coincidence Republican governors and state legislators began targeting public-sector unions after the 2010-midterm elections. These elections came shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which held it is unconstitutional to prohibit corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures in elections. 5 In practical terms, this liberalizes the spending that both unions and corporations can use to promote views about political candidates. 6 As a result, public-sector unions, the largest union contributors in the 2010-midterm elections, spent approximately $10 million on liberal candidates. 7 However, independent expenditures are not the entire story. Unions made an additional $96,574,695 in campaign contributions, 68% of which went to Democratic candidates. . 7 Id. Combined, public-sector and private-sector unions spent a total of $25.1 million in the 2010-midterm elections. 8 Id. at 305-06. Granted, these are pennies when compared to corporate contributions. Businesses contributed a total of $1.3 billion to campaigns, representing 72.2% of the total contributions in the 2010-midterm elections. Forty-nine percent of business contributions went to Democrats. illustrates the incentive that Republican leaders have to shrink the spending power of public-sector unions, either by slashing their collective bargaining rights or weakening these unions in general. 9 After gaining eleven governorships, the control of eighteen state legislatures (including those in Wisconsin, Ohio and Michigan), 10 and an estimable gain of 680 legislative seats throughout the country, 11 it was only a matter of time before Republican victors went after Democrats' largest supporters in 2010: public-sector unions. 12 Once they were sworn in, Republicans were armed with the impetus and economic climate-the Great Recession-to wage a war on public-sector workers. The Great Recession had a devastating effect on states. Approximately threefourths of states struggled with severe budget deficits.
13 From 2009-2012, states faced a combined $540 billion in budget shortfalls, and continue to face an estimated $55 billion budget shortfall for fiscal year 2013.
14 Private-sector workers have also fallen victim to the Great Recession. The unemployment rate in the United States more than doubled from 4.6% in 2007 to 9.6% in 2010, 15 and the hourly wage growth for private sector workers fell from 3.4% to 1.6% in the same period. 16 Using the recession as a wedge issue between private-sector workers and 
B. Waging a War
Within the first few months of 2011, more than a dozen states proposed and passed public sector labor reform laws under the guise of balancing the state budget.
19 Wisconsin led the charge with Governor Walker's "budget repair bill," or Act 10. 20 In essence, Act 10 slashes the collective bargaining rights for unionized public employees who supported the Democratic candidate for Wisconsin's gubernatorial election. 21 The act creates two classes of public employees: "public safety employees," which includes police officers or firefighters, and "general employees," which includes every other classification of public worker. 22 The first class of employees, public safety employees, retain all of their collective bargaining rights, as well as the right to have their dues automatically deducted from their paychecks. Meanwhile, workers belonging to the second class, general employees, are severely restricted. Their collective bargaining rights are limited to base wages, their union dues cannot be automatically deducted from their paychecks, and they are required to recertify their union annually. 23 The 24 The only clear distinction between the two groups of workers is that public safety employees belong to unions who supported Governor Walker in his campaign, while general employees belong to unions who supported his opponent.
25
While Wisconsin was facing weeks of public outcry around Act 10, Michigan legislators were busy crafting and approving a financial emergency manager law at the request of Governor Rick Snyder. 26 The law enabled Governor Snyder to appoint a financial manager for townships and school districts that are in a state of "financial emergency."
27 These managers would have the unilateral authority to dissolve cities and school districts, break collective bargaining agreements, and eliminate public services. 28 Nearly three weeks after the initial measures in Wisconsin and Michigan, Ohio Governor John Kasich followed suit with Senate Bill 5. 33 Senate Bill 5 barred public-sector strikes and slashed the collective bargaining rights of all public employees, either by expressly prohibiting them from collective bargaining or by limiting the terms and conditions of collective bargaining to the extent that workers no longer had these rights. 34 However, this legislation was repealed by 63% of voters during a ballot referendum on November 8, 2011.
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Since 2010 several other states have passed public-sector labor reform laws, including Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. 36 Not only does this illustrate the magnitude of the attack on unionized public-sector workers, but it also demonstrates how far Republican legislators are willing to go in order to suppress the "unpopular" viewpoints of public-sector unions.
C. The Contentious History of Public Sector Unionism
Public-sector unions have always been controversial. While private-sector workers won the right to bargain collectively in the early half of the twentieth century, 37 public-sector workers did not gain these rights until the 1960s. Perhaps ironically, Wisconsin was the first state to pass a law enabling public-sector workers to unionize. 38 Shortly thereafter, President John F. Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988, 39 which allowed federal service employees to join unions. By the late 1960s, courts finally accepted the argument that the "First Amendment barred public employers from discriminating against a public employee because of Over fifty years later, public-sector bargaining rights are determined on a state-by-state basis. At the turn of the twenty-first century, 29 states and the District of Columbia allowed major groups of public employees to collectively bargain. 42 Since the mid-1950s, public-sector unionism has increased from almost 0% to more than 35% today. 43 Compared to private-sector unionism, which declined from approximately 40% to less than 8% during the same period, the growth of publicsector unionism means that public employees are five times more likely to belong to a union than their private-sector counterparts. 44 Although some argue there is no true reason to treat public-sector workers differently from their private sector counterparts, 45 a fear of public-sector strikes continues to pervade the debate around public-sector unionism. 46 Most recently, the argument against public-sector unionism is the "overcompensated public employee," who drains state budgets despite the escalating budget deficits. As Part II.D., infra, will demonstrate, this argument is not only unpersuasive; it is also blatantly unfounded. 40 44 
Id.
45 See Slater, supra note 40, at 474-75 ("It is worth noting at the outset that there is nothing inherently natural about treating public-sector workers differently from private-sector workers. Most other industrial democracies have long covered both private-and public-sector workers with basically the same laws and legal rules."). Governor Daniels' sentiment has become the anthem of the attack on publicsector unionism. Pointing to the alleged overcompensation of unionized public workers, Republican governors and legislators claim that slashing the collective bargaining rights of public employees will help balance their states' budgets. 48 However, unless public employees are overpaid, this anthem is merely pretext for a conservative anti-union agenda. 49 Several factors must be considered when comparing public-sector workers with their private-sector counterparts. For instance, several occupations-such as police and firefighters-do not exist in the private sector, making it difficult to draw a perfect comparison. 50 The difference between teaching in the public sector and teaching in the private sector is also significant. 51 As a result, making a direct comparison between the two sectors may be impossible. The best alternative is to compare workers with similar human capital. 52 An employee's level of education is the most important factor in determining an employee's earning potential. 55 Over half of the full-time public-sector workforce has earned at least a four-year degree, compared to 35% of privatesector workers.
56 While this data may lead some to predict that public-sector workers are better compensated, that is not necessarily the case. The relatively high unionization rate in the public sector has created a wage floor for workers, which means that public employees with a high school education are better compensated than their private-sector counterparts.
57 However, this advantage disappears when employees are college-educated. Public employees with some college earn approximately 25% less total compensation than their private-sector counterparts.
58
The wage gap increases to 37% for public-sector workers with a professional degree.
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While the disparity in wages between sectors is staggering, it is also somewhat misleading. A more accurate comparison between sectors must also include total compensation, not just wages, since public employees receive most of their compensation through benefits. 60 To determine whether public-sector workers are overcompensated, their high benefits must offset their lower wages. Data analysis reveals that they do not. Even when these benefits are factored into the equation, public-sector workers are still undercompensated by 9-10% compared to 53 Id. 54 Id. at 753-54 ("Larger employers, that is, those with more than 100 employees, are significantly more likely to provide employees with benefits, in part, because they can spread administrative costs over a larger group and, for insurance purposes, can more readily diversify risk and self-insure. State and local governments resemble larger size private employers."). 55 See Lewin et al., supra note 50, at 756. 56 Id. at 754. 57 See KEEFE, supra note 3, at 5. 58 Id. at 6. This figure jumps to thirty-two percent when comparing wages alone. 59 Id. 61 This percentage drops to between 5.8% and 8.5% once the data is adjusted for the number of work hours per employee.
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E. The Impact of Unionization on Wages
Considering the growth in public-sector unionism discussed in Part II.C., supra, it is no surprise that over half of all unionized workers are employed in the public sector. 63 The disparity between private-and-public-sector unionism is an important factor to consider when comparing the total compensation between workers in both sectors, because it makes it difficult-if not impossible-to compare the wages of unionized public-sector workers with unionized privatesector workers. However, the impossibility of this comparison does not handicap the analysis. Research suggests that union status has little impact on the wage disparity between workers in the two sectors, as illustrated by the wage penalty incurred from working in the public sector. national labor relations laws," 67 it does protect the rights of public employees to join a union, pay union dues, and petition the government for a redress of grievances. By joining a union, workers exercise their freedom of association. By paying union dues, workers exercise their freedom of speech. In return, the union advocates on behalf of these workers, its members, through grievance procedures, legislative campaigns, electoral campaigns, and other expressive activities. In other words, "[a] union by its very nature is in existence to engage in speech." 68 In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, the Supreme Court used rational basis review to uphold Idaho's Voluntary Contribution Act, which prohibited "payroll deductions for political purposes."
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III. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
69 Although the Court acknowledged that "[r]estrictions on speech based on its content are 'presumptively invalid, '" 70 it held that the state did not abridge the unions' speech by barring political payroll deductions because the state "is not required to assist others in funding the expression of particular ideas, including political ones."
71 Furthermore, Idaho's law applied to all employees, regardless of their union status. 72 The recent labor reform laws in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio are different from the law at issue in Ysursa for several reasons: 1) they do not pertain to payroll deductions for political purposes, 2) they discriminate against the viewpoint of public-sector unions, 73 and 3) they are an actual burden on the speech of public-sector employees (rather than a refusal to subsidize political speech).
Placing the attack on unionized public-sector workers in context, it is clear that these labor reform laws target the viewpoint of public-sector unions that 67 Id. 70 Id. at 358. 71 Id. at 358-59. 72 Id. at 356 ("The Act covers all employees, 'including all employees of the state and its political subdivisions.'"). 73 The Supreme Court has long recognized that a union's speech is protected under the First Amendment. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) ("Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas that the First Amendment seeks to foster . . . . The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not 'natural persons.'") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 74 Wisconsin's Act 10 is perhaps the most blatant violation of the First Amendment for this reason: not only does the law create two classes of public-sector employees, but it also targets the speech of public-sector workers whose unions did not endorse Governor Walker in 2010. 75 Similarly, Michigan's Act 53 only targets the speech of public school employees that are unionized.
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The laws highlighted in this note also burden the speech rights of publicsector workers and their unions. For instance, while Wisconsin's Act 10 prohibits the automatic deduction of dues for general employees and requires annual recertification for the unions representing them, these same restrictions do not apply to public safety employees. 77 The application of Michigan's Act 53 prohibits the automatic deduction of union dues from public school employees, which is the "most convenient way to raise funds to support the Union's expressive activities." Michigan, also make it more difficult for unions to collect the revenue they need in order to engage in speech.
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Strict scrutiny analysis applies when the freedom of speech is burdened, 81 or when the law discriminates against a single viewpoint. 82 The laws in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio arguably do both. To survive strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 83 The only reason proffered for these labor reform laws, at least publicly, is the interest of balancing state budgets. Given the Great Recession and the financial crisis faced by many states, 84 this proffered reason may constitute a compelling state interest. However, having a compelling state interest only satisfies one part of the analysis.
These laws also fail the second part of strict scrutiny analysis, because they are not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of balancing a state's budget (if this is a compelling state interest at all). These laws are underinclusive by definition, because they discriminate against a particular viewpoint: the viewpoint of public-sector unions that support Democratic candidates. As Professor Lofaso writes, 80 Even so, it is important to note that right-to-work laws are legal. Under the Taft In other words, the campaign contributions of public-sector unions are the true motivation behind these laws. Republican lawmakers are attempting to stomp out the voices of opposition by weakening the largest supporter of Democratic candidates: public-sector unions. By discriminating against a particular viewpoint, or speaker, these laws are the type of restriction on speech that the First Amendment finds abhorrent. 86 As the Supreme Court has stated, free speech is a necessary means to hold public officials accountable to the people, and "[t]he First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office." 87 These laws frustrate the plain language and policies of the First Amendment, and are therefore unconstitutional.
IV. CHALLENGING THESE LAWS UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
88 Acknowledging the "practical reality that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another," the Supreme Court has stated that it will "uphold a law that neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class so long as the classification bears a rational relation to some legitimate end." 89 A rational basis exists if a classification is rationally related to a legitimate government objective. 90 85 Lofaso, supra note 6, at 307. 86 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 ("Premised on mistrust of government power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints."). 87 Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 88 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 89 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 621 (1996). 90 Id. at 631.
While this standard of review is deferential, it is also used to "ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."
91 For instance, in Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court used rational basis review to strike down Amendment 2 in Colorado, which prohibited the legislature from passing statutes protecting citizens because of their sexual orientation. 92 Rejecting the state's justification for the law-that it would prevent homosexuals from having "special treatment" under the law 93 -the Supreme Court concluded that Amendment 2 "classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else." 94 Consequently, Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause. 95 Public-sector labor reform laws, such as those passed in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio, create two classes of public-sector workers: those who belong to a union, and those who do not. While this classification implicates the Equal Protection Clause, these workers are not members of a suspect class, nor do they have a fundamental right to collective bargaining. Therefore, laws that target unionized public-sector workers will be upheld as long as they survive rational basis review.
Republicans purport, at least publicly, that balancing the state budget is the underlying goal of these recent public-sector labor reform laws. As newly elected governors inherit serious state financial woes, it is logical for them to propose measures to reduce or eliminate the state budget deficit. Consequently, reducing the state budget deficit is a legitimate goal for governors and state legislatures. However, having a legitimate goal is only half of the required analysis under rational basis review: the law must also bear a rational relation to the legitimate goal. 96 To determine whether laws that target unionized public workers are constitutional, there must be a rational relation between the recent attack against unionized public employees and reducing a state's budget deficit.
The proffered explanation behind the recent public-sector labor reform laws is that since unionized public employees are overcompensated, cutting their wages 91 Id. at 633. 92 Id. at 635-36. 93 Id. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 94 Id. at 635. 95 Id. at 635-36. 96 Id. at 631. and collective bargaining rights will save the state millions of dollars. 97 Yet, research indicates that public employees are not overcompensated. While unionization in the public sector has established a wage floor that better compensates public employees with a high school education, college-educated employees are compensated 25% less than their private-sector counterparts.
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Although public employees receive more of their total compensation through benefits, they are still undercompensated by 11%. 99 The fact that public employees are significantly undercompensated means that "[p]ublic-sector workers' compensation is neither the cause, nor can it be the solution to a state's financial problems." 100 The unionization of public employees is also not the cause of state budget deficits. On average, states that allow public-sector collective bargaining have a 14% budget deficit, while states that bar public-sector collective bargaining have a 16.5% budget deficit. 101 Thus, there is no correlation between unionized public-sector workers and state budget deficits, nor is there a rational relation between these labor reform laws and the legitimate goal of reducing state budget deficits.
The political climate surrounding the passage of these labor reform laws sheds light on the true reasons behind the classification of unionized public-sector workers: that is, "for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law." 102 In an effort to weaken public-sector unions, Republican leaders and lawmakers have slashed the political and collective bargaining rights of civil servants. These laws not only disadvantage public-sector unions by lessening the amount available for campaign contributions, but they also place public employees, who already take a significant pay penalty by entering the public sector, at even more of a disadvantage. Consequently, these laws violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 97 See Greenhouse, supra note 18.
98 KEEFE, supra note 3, at 6. 99 Id. at 9; see also supra Part II.D. 100 KEEFE, supra note 3, at 12.
101 See Slater, supra note 40, at 491-92. 102 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
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. 116 Judge Denise Page Hood of the Eastern District of Michigan found that plaintiffs would likely prevail on their equal protection challenge because attacking education-sector unions is not rationally related to the purported goal of cost savings for the state of Michigan. 117 For starters, the "[d]efendants were [] unable to explain, let alone show, how cost savings was not applicable to any other similarly situated union in the public sector that is facing budgetary crisis."
118
Taking a close look at the political context in which Act 53 was passed, Judge Hood concluded that the "attempt to undercut union power coupled with the legislative history of Act 53 strongly supports the argument that Defendants' real motive for the amendment was to suppress an unpopular group."
119 Judge Hood also found it was likely that plaintiffs would prevail in their First Amendment challenge because Act 53 targets "only one viewpoint and one set of speakers for discrimination: the unions."
120 After her careful analysis, Judge Hood enjoined the defendants, which included the chairman and members of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, from enforcing Act 53's prohibition on the payroll deduction of union's dues and service fees. 121 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the unions were unlikely to succeed in their First Amendment and Equal Protection claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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C. Ohio
In Ohio, unions and community members chose a different forum: the ballot initiative. On November 8, 2011, Ohioans voted to repeal Senate Bill 5. 123 Individuals and organizations on both sides of the issue poured over $50 million into the ballot initiative, making it one of the most expensive ballot initiatives ever waged. 124 After the repeal, Governor Kasich responded by taking a pause and
